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Abstract 
In a recent article in Qualitative Research, Norman Denzin discussed a variety of 
threats to qualitative research posed by institutional and professional organizational 
actors who would elevate Randomized Control Trials and associated practices as the 
gold standard indexing the quality of all social research. Informed by his long 
established contributions to the constantly changing field of research methodology, 
Denzin brought passion, and a rich variety of arguments, to the debate. I argue that 
this also brought some lapses of rigour that require attention if qualitative 
methodologists are to put their best case against the narrow and intolerant vision 
offered by the proponents of gold standards. 
 
 
 
In his recent article in Qualitative Research (Denzin, 2009), Norman Denzin writes 
of ‘the elephant in the living room’. Denzin’s elephant is the threat posed by 
contemporary institutional moves to either valorize an antediluvian vision of 
qualitative research or dismiss this field of intellectual endeavour altogether by 
elevating Randomized Control Trials as the gold standard of all social research. These 
are real threats to graduate students, academics seeking tenure and researchers seeking 
funding. But this note discusses a different pachyderm, namely, Denzin’s 
inconsistency of argument and lapses of rigour. My purpose is not to offer new 
arguments but to suggest ways to do justice to Denzin’s arguments against the threat. 
 
Point 1: effective resistance requires consistency of argument. Denzin contradicts 
positions of which he is himself the originator. For example, he criticizes mixed-
methods research for failing to address incommensurability. Yet he authored what 
remains the defining exposition of mixed methods and sociological triangulation 
(Denzin, 1970). It would be valuable  to know how Denzin connects his previous and 
current thinking. Currently, Denzin wants to condemn mixed methods as covert 
positivism or quasi-foundationalism. 
 
This would be more compelling if Denzin used his authoritative grasp of mixed-
method practice to think himself into the head of the gold standards lobby 
advocating RCTs and give us a contemporary statement of the incommensurability 
argument that could be used against them. ‘Incommensurability’ is an absolutist 
argument, and absolutism surely presents problems for a field as alert to shades of grey 
as is qualitative research. Might incommensurability be a ‘more or less thing’? Might 
some mixes of method be less wrong than others? Denzin believes that truth is always 
‘partial’. Agreed – so how can the ‘truth’ of incommensurability be absolute? 
 
Similarly, Denzin ridicules a US disability research organization’s call for criteria of 
‘credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability’, but Denzin himself 
offered those criteria, and this time it wasn’t back in the 1970s. According to Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994: 14), criteria of ‘credibility, transferability, dependability and 
 confirmability replace  the ... positivist criteria of internal and external validity, 
reliability and objectivity’. Now he suggests such a position is a mark of the ‘science’ 
approach he repudiates. Why were those criteria satisfactory in the 1990s but not now? 
 
Point 2: to carry arguments, accuracy is important. Denzin gets factual matters 
embarrassingly wrong. Any Brit who reads the statement about ‘the British RAE’ (p. 
143) would know that it is not a ‘discourse advocating RCT’. British universities  are, 
with  one exception, state-funded,  and the Higher Education Funding Council assesses 
the research that government pays for. As a generic system for evaluating research the 
RAE is indifferent to methodological debates. HEFC delegates the evaluations to 
panels of academics from the discipline whose output they are evaluating. 
Qualitative researchers are represented not only on sociology panels but in education, 
socio-legal studies, social policy, criminology, law, health studies (‘subjects allied to 
medicine’), sport science, dance and theatre studies, and even psychology. Plenty 
of qualitative work was rated highly, including work in Denzin’s preferred non- 
foundationalist/feminist and communitarian vein. 
 
Point 3: arguments are needed that generalize where warranted and reflect differences 
where appropriate. Denzin is best on his own ground – the situation in the USA, and 
particularly, in US educational research. The USA certainly does have a problem with 
recurrent hostility to qualitative research. But the USA is big, and Denzin over-
generalizes. His vision cannot accommodate, for instance, the 2008 conference on 
‘optimal coding of open-ended survey data’ convened by the Institute of Social Research 
at the University of Michigan. The meeting explored how qualitative  methods could 
extract  more value from open-ended items on the American National Election Survey. 
Survey research does not come much more institutional than ANES. It is direct-funded 
by the US Congress and the current grantholders are an economist and a psychologist. 
Perhaps the gold standards straitjacket is not as tight as Denzin suggests. 
 
The picture is more mixed in Europe, too. For instance, the Council of European Social Science 
Data Archives is currently promoting the archiving of qualitative data across Europe. State 
money is going into creating archives of exactly the kind of data the gold standards people 
think is worthless. Some national research com- munities in the US sphere of influence do 
ape 1950s US positivism but qualitative research endures even there (Saludadez and Garcia, 
2001). Denzin offers a binary us/them vision in the same article as he argues that 
qualitative research’s essential position is that there are many truths, all partial. 
 
European institutional actors’ efforts to set standards for qualitative research have 
been less crass than those of the US National Science Foundation. Qualitative 
research commissioned by UK government and other institutional bodies has been 
growing for some years. Denzin notes that the Cabinet Office commissioned the Spencer 
Review (Spencer et al., 2003) to set criteria. It is true that the criteria they produced 
were unwieldy but this reflects their inclusiveness. They do not rule out any form of 
qualitative research, are not formatted as a checklist but as a set of desiderata, and they 
emphasize discretionary interpretation. More important than Spencer, however, is the 
government’s Competency Framework for Social Research. It (a) specifies that anyone 
employed by government as a social researcher must understand and demonstrate 
competence in qualitative methods; and (b) is couched in neutral terms with no 
suggestion that any particular method (e.g. RCTs) or analytic technique is 
necessarily superior to any other. The UK government continues regularly to 
commission qualitative research. There are similar circumstances in certain other 
European countries but on the strength of the British case alone it is arguable that 
 the standards debate can actually help create a niche for applied qualitative research. 
 
Point 4: effective critique should accurately reflect opponents’ positions. Denzin 
mischaracterizes positions he opposes. For instance,  he lists 13 recommendations aimed 
at research agencies, publishers, and universities by the National Research Council. 
The recommendations are innocuous and do not bear on the gold standards dispute. 
Immediately after the list, Denzin summarizes Maxwell’s critique of the NRC 
‘formulations’. Maxwell’s critique cannot be about the recommendations, though, 
because Denzin’s summary of Maxwell’s critique doesn’t include a single point that 
relates to the items on the list, which includes things like universities should ‘ensure 
students develop deep methodological knowledge’. This sentiment may be banal but it 
also has no relevance to the attack on interpretivism that is Maxwell’s (and Denzin’s) 
concern. Similarly, Denzin goes on to assert that ‘the NRC is clear on this point’ 
(concerning the wonders of RCT) but instead of quoting NRC he quotes a 
commentary by Feuer et al. (2002). The unprepared reader cannot know whether 
Feuer et al. are characterizing the NRC position or asserting their own. We need to 
know what the NRC says. 
 
Another example of mischaracterization is Denzin’s repetition of an error from the first 
edition of his famous Handbook. He states that ‘Nudist’ (a qualitative software package) 
is a ‘form of analysis’. No qualitative software package is a ‘form of analysis’, it is a tool 
that supports the ‘form of analysis’ the user wants to apply. It does not have an 
analytic approach built into it. That would be commercial suicide, apart from 
anything else. Like  SPSS does for stats, qualitative software packages try to support the 
widest possible range of analytic approaches. This is primarily because most qualitative 
software developers are academics, but it also happens to maximize  sales. The 
misconception that qualitative software is a distinct ‘form of analysis’ has been widely 
rebutted for some while (Lee and Fielding, 1991; Tesch, 1990). Moreover, does a single-
word reference to an obsolete and oddly-named software package, without any further 
explanation,  serve readers who may be unfamiliar with qualitative software? 
 
Point 5: telling arguments employ logic and evidence without recourse to personalized 
authority. Denzin appears at times to be in dialogue with himself and not with  the 
reader. For instance, his paragraph about data sharing appears to be the germ of a 
commentary on the archiving and secondary analysis controversy. But Denzin goes 
no further than a self-referential series of questions suggesting a hubristic, even selfish 
posture (paraphrasing, ‘these data are mine and I am not going to share’) without giving 
readers enough to understand why such a position might be warranted.  A potentially 
damaging weakness in the gold standards position is treated as a throwaway line, as if it’s 
enough for readers to know that the Collaborators want us to share and since they are 
nasty we should refuse. 
 
Also tantalizingly incomplete is Denzin’s commentary on blind peer review. The practice 
is lambasted but he does not discuss alternatives. This despite the fact that the scientific 
establishment he castigates includes a notably brave practice of signed reviews, a 
distinctive feature of one branch of US science funding. Some regard it as a more 
effective check on rigour than blind reviews (signed reviews make reviewers more 
accountable). There is a worthwhile debate to be had about different peer review 
formats but they are not configured along the gold standard/interpretivist binary. Some 
funders of qualitative research disclose reviewer and applicant identities and others 
don’t. Some social research journals use double-blind reviews, some don’t. If ‘blind 
peer review’ is the epitome of gold standard science then the qualitative field is as 
 culpable as biomedicine. 
 
A final concern is the article’s implication (particularly strong on p. 152) that the 
adoption of intellectual positions like postpositivism is done entirely in response to the 
American gold standards debate. Denzin implies that people take up intellectual stands 
and orientations in an effort to curry favour with, or show their resistance to, the US 
science establishment. That is both parochial and cynical. There are many reasons that 
people adopt an intellectual orientation. In the qualitative field, the kind of 
instrumentalism Denzin implies is probably rare, else why would we commit to 
methodologies whose warrant is endlessly contested? 
 
Denzin’s analysis almost wholly considers the current situation in the USA, with 
occasional and sometimes inaccurate mention of other places. In the context of his 
reference to Habermas and Bourdieu on ‘global audit culture’ this stands in danger of 
implying that the world’s qualitative researchers adopt their intellectual affinities in 
reaction to the US situation. If a qualitative researcher from any other country were 
to claim that its situation determined the world’s research interests that view wouldn’t 
stand for a moment. 
 
Having spent 31 years as a qualitative sociologist in an engineering university I share the 
opposition to the dirigisme and anti-intellectualism of the gold standards lobby by 
authorities like Denzin (2009) and Becker (2009). Righteous indignation is often a spur to 
creativity but in this debate we need arguments that will persuade rather than ones 
handing opponents an easy win. 
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